There is to be a new Joint Committee to consider the National Security Strategy.

The first National Security Strategy was published in March 2008 and looks beyond the traditional areas of foreign, defence and security policies to include transnational crime, pandemics and flooding.

The Strategy was updated in June 2009 with further updates to be produced every year.  It has always been the intention that there would be a Joint Parliamentary Committee with members drawn from both Houses to help monitor the implementation and development of the Strategy.

The Committee is to consist of twelve Commons members, including the Chairmen of the Departmental Select Committees on Foreign Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs, International Development, Business and Enterprise, Energy and Climate Change, and Justice, and also the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and ten Lords members (and I have been asked to be one of these).

The latest appalling news from Baghdad that at least forty people have been killed by a female suicide bomber is a timely reminder that simple profiling will never be enough to combat determined terrorists.

The idea that by stopping and searching all young Asian males that you would significantly reduce the risk of suicide bombing is a fallacy.  As this news reminds us, not all such bombers are males.  Richard Reid, the convicted shoe bomber, was not Asian and was a convert to Islam.  And, of course, not all Asians are Muslims, nor are all Muslims Asian.  And most important of all, the vast majority of Muslims are not violent extremists and are not potential terrorists.

Crude profiling will not only be ineffective, but it will increasingly alienate precisely those people that the authorities need to be working with if they are to be effective in combatting terrorism.

In the Daily Telegraph on Saturday, Assistant Commissioner John Yates, the most senior counter-terrorist police officer in the UK, made the case for profiling.  But – and it is a big but – he was NOT arguing for crude profiling.  He was arguing for “intelligent” profiling.  And, yes, this does involve stopping people based on appearance and behaviour, but it is also about ” using “common sense” and “street-craft” to recognise suspicious behaviour.”

The Telegraph report goes on (mainly focussing on stops at airports):

“Mr Yates called for searches to be carried out using intelligence databases, and “sharp thinking” on the ground.

He said that suspicions should be aroused by an individual’s personal history and pattern of travel, how they bought their ticket, and their luggage.

The anti-terrorism chief continued: “At the same time, we must encourage police and security staff to use their experience, their street-craft – their ‘nous’. This means considering a range of factors – dress, body language, behaviour or simply something that’s ‘not quite right’.

“This puts the onus on our staff to be intelligent and to act with common sense.””

This is an approach that most people would support and it is right that this is the ethos now being promoted by the Metropolitan Police.  For it to work, of course, there also needs to be a rigorous system of management supervision and external scrutiny to make sure that the policy is not abused or mis-applied.

At the last meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority – all of two months ago – I raised the Human Rights Watch report, entitled “Cruel Britannia” in which five cases were reported of individuals who had been tortured overseas and alleged that British officials were involved.  I sought assurances about Metropolitan Police involvement in any of the cases.

At the time, the Commissioner said he had no reason to believe that any Metropolitan Police officers were involved, but he would check and report back.  He has now done so and formally reported to the Authority today that:

“We can confirm that we are satisfied that there can be no basis to any allegation that MPS officers could have been complicit in torture.”

The news that the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that police stops and searches under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act are illegal and contravene the rights of those stopped has prompted an interesting post on Left Foot Forward by Andy Hull who worked with me on the MPA report, “Counter Terrorism: The London Debate“.

I agree with most of what Andy Hull has written, but I don’t however accept that Section 44 stops are futile.  They play an important part in target-hardening.  If potential terrorists know that they run a substantial risk of being stopped by the police and searched near a particular target, then that target is a less attractive one and the risks are reduced.

However, in the past, Section 44 powers have been used much too widely with very large areas being designated by the police and approved by successive Home Secretaries.  Following the MPA report and subsequent debate, the Metropolitan Police have radically revised the way in which they use the power with a much more rigorous approach being taken as to which areas are designated for the use of Section 44 stops.  A lot of effort has also gone into the guidance given to officers on the use of the power and the manner in which stops are conducted.

Although the grounds of the ECHR ruling are much broader I do wonder whether the position taken by the Court would have been quite so clear had the new approach applied when the incident that led to the case took place.

The Government are now considering an appeal and in the meantime the existing regime of Section 44 stops remains in force.

My experience is that most members of the public find it a reassurance that the power exists and is used and that this is true even if they are the subject of the stop, provided that the context is explained and the stop is conducted with a degree of respect.

Of course, demonstrating that attacks have been deterred is necessarily difficult to do.  However, my own guess is that most people would feel that the interference in their rights by there being a possibility of being stopped and searched in areas near to potential terrorist targets is  a small price to pay if it prevents them being blown up.  The right to life works both ways after all.

I see that my MPA colleague James Cleverly has fallen (despite being a Tory) into the typical trap that usually catches the LibDems of having a Pavlovian reaction every time the words “counter-terrorism” or “anti-terrorism” are seen.

He has repeated the myth that the UK Government wrongly used counter-terrorist powers to freeze the assets of Icelandic banks when it looked as though British citizens and institutions might suffer when the banks appeared to be about to default.

The powers used were in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.

LibDems and James Cleverly should notice that, although the Act’s title contains the magic word “anti-terrorism”, it is also about “crime and security”.

The specific power used was the freezing power and the Act specifies the following:

“(1) The Treasury may make a freezing order if the following two conditions are satisfied.

(2) The first condition is that the Treasury reasonably believe that—

(a) action to the detriment of the United Kingdom’s economy (or part of it) has been or is likely to be taken by a person or persons, or

(b) action constituting a threat to the life or property of one or more nationals of the United Kingdom or residents of the United Kingdom has been or is likely to be taken by a person or persons.

(3) If one person is believed to have taken or to be likely to take the action the second condition is that the person is—

(a) the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or

(b) a resident of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.

(4) If two or more persons are believed to have taken or to be likely to take the action the second condition is that each of them falls within paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (3); and different persons may fall within different paragraphs.”

Even a LibDem (and especially someone who is usually more sensible – like James Cleverly) might recognise that these powers are not about combatting terrorism.  They are more general powers and are about protecting the UK economy and/or the property of UK nationals.

The question that James Cleverly has to answer – I don’t expect a coherent response from the LibDems – is why repeat something that is wrong and more particularly is he against protecting the UK economy and the property of British citizens?

Everybody knows that the European Parliament is at the cutting edge of global political thought.

So it is no surprise to discover that in 2005 (long before last month’s attempted airline bombing made them a world-wide must-have) the European Parliament bought six full body scanners to protect MEPs from being attacked in the Parliament buildings.

Given the legendary efficiency of the EU institutions, it is also no surprise to learn that these six machines – purchased for over 700,000 Euros – have never been used.  Apparently, in 2008 the Parliament rejected a bill to permit the use of such scanners across the EU on the grounds that the graphic images provided by such scanners constituted a “virtual strip search”.  It is thought that MEPs were not aware at the time that the Parliament had six scanners lying around in their unopened boxes.

After the MEPs had voted against the use of such scanners, European Parliament officials then “rushed” to dispose of the unwanted items.  Obviously, there are complex procedures to be followed in such cases, so that the invitation to bid for the six scanners will only be issued in the next few days.  The delay, of course, means that, given the current fashion for full body scanning, there should be no shortage of bidders.

But should the European Parliament still be going ahead with the sales, in the light of the latest security threats?  Of course it should – as its spokesperson perspicaciously points out, “The Parliament is not an airport”.

I have been reading “Torture Team: Uncovering War crimes in the Land of the Free” by Philippe Sands, Professor of Law at University College, London (he is also a practising barrister at the Matrix Chambers and an Arsenal fan – although neither of these should be held against him).

The book describes in detail – on occasions meeting by meeting and memo by memo – how the use of “aggressive interrogation techniques” came to be authorised against detainees at Guantanamo Bay.  This overturned existing US policy dating back at least as far as 1863 when President Abraham Lincoln issued the instruction that “military necessity does not admit of cruelty … nor of torture to extract confessions”.  Along the way, it was asserted that the Geneva Convention does not apply to those detained as part of the so-called “war on terror”.

The specific techniques included “water-boarding”, deprivation of sleep, maintenance of stress positions for long periods (the then US Secretary for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, entered a caveat on the memo approving this, saying that he thought the restriction on standing for more than four hours was unnecessary as he personally often stood for much longer than that during the course of a day), humiliation, nudity in front of female soldiers, and exposure to extremes of room temperature.

In at least one instance, these techniques were repeated daily for more than seven weeks with a detainee who had already been kept isolated for many months.  It is apparent that no new information of any substance was obtained from this individual as a result of this “aggressive interrogation”.  (This echoes the remarks made to me by a former senior official of the Secret Intelligence Service: “Not only is torture illegal and morally wrong, it doesn’t work anyway”.)  The Bush administration eventually charged the individual with a list of terrorist offences including murder, only to withdraw the charges a few months later, admitting that the way he had been treated “met the legal definition of torture”.

Indeed, that admission of torture is significant.  Eventually, the Bush administration was constrained by proper legal process.  In 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that Guantanamo detainees were subject to Common Article Three of the Geneva Convention and had to be treated humanely.  And by then the various documents authorising “aggressive interrogation” had been revoked.

However, the process by which those documents had originally been produced is fascinating.  Legal advice was obtained, so that those acting on the authorisation could be assured that “aggressive interrogation” was lawful.  However, as Sands points out this advice was not authoritative and bypassed the proper channels (in particular, those lawyers within the military who would have challenged what was being suggested).

Sands draws a distinction between lawyers offering advice and those providing advocacy for a point of view.  The former must present the law clearly and indicate if their advice would be commonly accepted or is likely to be accepted by the Courts.  The arguments used as part of the advocacy of the latter is not the same as advice.

Sands concludes that the lawyers involved in the decisions to authorise “aggressive interrogation” are just as culpable as those who actually made the decisions.

Whether or not any of this leads to charges in the US or elsewhere for war crimes is one thing, but the lessons about advice are relevant to all politicians whatever the level of the decision being taken.

I remember as a local council leader often seeking advice on the legality of policies proposed.  While a legal opinion that supported the proposed action provided protection to those councillors making the decision, it was much more important to know whether the decision was sustainable (rather than arguable) if the matter was ever challenged in court.

Two recent articles demonstrate how seriously more and more countries are taking the possibility of war in cyberspace, either by developing their own offensive capability or by strengthening internet security and resilience.  There are even talks about a new international treaty to “demilitarise” cyberspace.

According to Reuters, Major-General Amos Yadlin, Israel’s chief of military intelligence, has placed vulnerability to hacking in the same list of security threats to the State of Israel as the Iranian nuclear project and Syrian and Islamist guerrillas attacking across Israel’s borders.

He also made it clear that Israeli armed forces had the means to provide network security and launch cyber attacks of their own, pointing out that:

“The cyberwarfare field fits well with the state of Israel’s defense doctrine  …. This is an enterprise that is entirely blue and white (ie. Israeli) and does not rely on foreign assistance or technology. It is a field that is very well known to young Israelis, in a country that was recently crowned a ‘start-up nation’.”

Reuters says that:

“Cyberwarfare teams nestle deep within Israel’s spy agencies, which have extensive experience in traditional sabotage techniques and are cloaked in official secrecy and censorship.

They can draw on the know-how of Israeli commercial firms that are among the world’s hi-tech leaders and whose staff are often veterans of elite computer units in the conscript army.”

Meanwhile, the New York Times reports that the United States has begun talks with Russia and a United Nations arms control committee about strengthening Internet security and limiting military use of cyberspace.  According to the New York Times:

“Many countries, including the United States, are developing weapons for use on computer networks that are ever more integral to the operations of everything from banks to electrical power systems to government offices. They include “logic bombs” that can be hidden in computers to halt them at crucial times or damage circuitry; “botnets” that can disable or spy on Web sites and networks; or microwave radiation devices that can burn out computer circuits miles away.”

The Russians are apparently arguing that the increasing challenges posed by military activities to civilian computer networks can be best dealt with by an international treaty, similar to treaties that have limited the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

So where is the UK on all of this?

Well according to Major-General Yadlin, Britain is setting up a cyberwarfare command, and this demonstrates why Israel needs to have its own “soldiers and officers” dedicated to this field.

I have to admit that the existence of a UK cyberwarfare command is new to me – not that I (or many other people either – apart presumably from Major-General Yadlin) would necessarily know if it did exist.

My concern has usually been the opposite and that until recently at least the UK has seemed naively complacent about the scale of the cyber-threats faced.

The publication of a national cyber security strategy has been a welcome first step in the right direction (as I have commented before) and there are also signs of increasing Parliamentary interest in the matter (although when I sat in on the last part of the latest House of Lords hearing on internet security in Europe the main preoccupation seemed to be that Heraklion – where the relevant EU agency is based – is awfully difficult to get to from London).

Nevertheless, these two articles do show that the rest of the world recognises the problem, so the UK probably ought to be doing more as well (unless we really do have a cutting edge cyberwarfare command based in a bunker underneath Cheltenham).

The Parliamentary Information Technology Committee (PITCOM), of which I am the Honorary Treasurer, has produced a useful briefing summarising the key issues about the increasing reliance of the critical national infrastructure (CNI) on technology and the crucial importance of ensuring that that technology is resilient and adequately protected.

The potential vulnerability of the CNI to a variety of threats and the need to raise the level of protection and readiness of the UK to respond to attacks are highlighted.  The briefing also emphasises the importance of partnership between the Government and the private sector to mitigate risks, particularly given the extent to which major parts of the CNI are under private ownership and may not automatically prioritise the national interest above short-term commercial interests.

The briefing should be essential reading for all Parliamentary candidates and anyone else interested in national security.

I have attended many meetings and events in Portcullis House, the office block for MPs built at a cost of £2 million per office over Westminster underground station, during the last ten years.  However, the one I went to yesterday undoubtedly stands out as the most emotionally powerful of all.

The occasion was a performance by the Khayaal Theatre Company of its production “Hearts and Minds“.  This was sponsored by Phyllis Starkey MP, who is Chair of the House of Commons Select Committee on Communities and Local Government that is currently conducting an inquiry into the Government’s Preventing Violent Extremism programme.

The play addresses the issues facing young British Muslims, in terms of identity, citizenship, community cohesion and extremism.  It has been performed in numerous schools and colleges around the country and – no doubt because its content has been based on extensive discussion with young British Muslims and inspired by real events – has clearly struck a chord with its audiences.

Comedy alternates with raw emotion.  The interactions that young people of all cultures have with their parents, with their teachers and with each other are explored.  The conflicting feelings that the young protagonists have as they wrestle with the dilemmas that they face growing up in Britain today are laid bare in all their complexity.

If anyone believes that there are simple answers to how “hearts and minds” can be won over to reject violent extremism, what is needed to embrace a tolerant approach to difference or indeed what comprises “Britishness” and nationality, they should watch this play.

I am pleased that so many school-age young people have been given the opportunity to see this production.  The debates that it generates amongst them can only be helpful to sustaining a cohesive society in which difference is not only tolerated but valued.

My only regret was how few Parliamentarians were in the audience (and yes I know there was a lot going on with the PBR and all that) – apart from Phyllis Starkey and myself, I only spotted one other member of either House (a fellow Labour Peer).